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DELEGATION OF POWERS TO AND WITHIN
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS*
HARvEy PINNE4t
A. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SEPARATION OF POwERS
There is no little literature on the delegation of powers and much of
it is controversial. The problem is doctrinal and practical: stemming
from the doctrine of the separation of powers the general rule, a negative
one, is that delegated powers cannot be redelegated. Through the Con-
stitution the sovereign people have delegated to the congress the power
to legislate, to the president the power to execute the laws, and to the
courts the power to interpret and apply them. With certain constitu-
tional and practical exceptions, each department is to confine itself to
the exercise of its own powers and is neither to encroach on the pre-
serves of the other two, nor evade its own responsibility by passing its
powers on.'
Congress, having had the power to legislate placed in its hands, may
not delegate this power to other agencies. Whatever may be the his-
torical reasons for the rule, the practical one would seem to be that
those elected by the voters to determine the policies of government
should bear that responsibility so that there remains within easy reach
of the voters a ready means by which undesired policies of government
may be changed.
The significance of this is readily apparent if we keep in mind the
realistic view that the constitution lies in accepted practice. Through
the publicity given to their written constitution and its manipulation by
the Supreme Court, Americans tend to be misled into the view that the
* This article is a revised section of Pinney, Federal Government Corporatios
as Instrumentalities of Government and of Administration (Unpublished thesis in
New York University Library).
t Instructor, Department of Government, Washington Square College, New
York University.
1The general doctrine is to be found in 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsTITUTIoN.AL
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1929) c. 88-90, pp. 1616-1681. See also 12 C. J.
802-955.
Professor Charles C. Thach, suggested that the separation of powers was
designed to promote efficiency through division of labor: "The adoption of the
principle of separation of powers, as interpreted to mean the exercise of different
functions of government by departments officered by entirely different individuals,
also seemed insistently demanded as a sine qua non of governmental efficiency.
It seemed, indeed, the ony way to secure that functional distribution, that wrest-
ing of non-legislative powers from a body that ought to be entirely legislative,
which was so greatly desired. It gave point and meaning to the statements of the
two theorists whose influence was so great, Blackstone and Montesquieu, that
confusion of powers in the same hands was tyranny." THE CREATION OF THE,
PREsmENCY, 1775-1789, A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONA, HISTORY (1922) 76.
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workings of their government are controlled by a precise legal docu-
ment. Actually, the American constitutional system, like that of Great
Britain,2 is institutional in nature,3 and if the delegation of powers by
congress to the adminigtrative branches of government becomes a na-
tional habit acquiesced in by the courts, we shall presently become aware
that a significant constitutional change has taken place and that the
courts, instead of resisting such delegation, will be protecting it. Such
a transformation is already under way.4 The question of delegation of
powers to government corporations is, therefore, but a part of a much
larger problem.
Since the government is not an impartial instrument of the general
welfare, but a political instrument dominated by partisan interests and
administered by fallible and interested individuals, it is neither an im-
partial arbiter between the interests of individuals and groups in con-
lict, nor between itself and citizens parties to a dispute. It was this
partiality of the government which gave rise to the doctrine that the
centralization of law-making, law-execution, and the adjudication of
conflicts in one authority was tyranny. The partial use of these com-
bined powers was evidence of the class nature of the state.
The breakdown of tyranny so defined, that is, the monopolization of
the power of government by a ruling family or class, is displayed in
that long historical sequence in which the struggle between the Crown
and Parliament is the most dramatic feature. The success of the new
wealthy classes in wresting power from the Crown had the effect of
taking legislative (policy-determining) power from the executive and
vesting it in the Parliament.
2See the realistic views presented by the youthful John Quincy Adams in his
"Publicola"' papers, WRITINGs (edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford, 1913).
See MUIR, How BRITAIN is GovEwmn (1930); WADE AND PHILLIPS, CONsTI-
TuTiONAL LAW (1931). There are also the more or less standard works of
ANsoN, LAW AND CusTOM OF THE CoNsTTUTrIoN (5th ed. 1922) ; BAGEHOT, THE
ENGLISH CoNsTIUaTIoN (Rev. ed. 1872); and DiczE, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(8th ed. 1927).
'Llewellyn, The Constitution as aw Institution (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1. See
MCBAIN, THE LrvNa CONSTITUTION, A CONSIDERATION OF THE REALITIrES AND
LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAWV (1927); TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CoN-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1890).
'DKINsoir, ADmiISTRAVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927);
ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIvE LAW (1928). Dean Roscoe Pound early
recognized this tendency in the courts to retrench, and in 1907 he wrote: "A
brief review of the course of judicial decision for the past fifty years will show
that the judiciary has begun to fall into line, and that powers which fifty years
ago would have been held purely judicial and jealously guarded from executive
exercise are now decided to be administrative only and are cheerfully conceded to
boards and commissions." Pound, Executive Justice (1907) 55 Am. L. REG. 137,
139.5 FtzxD, ADMINIsTRATI- PowFzRs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY, A CoM-
PARAIvn Suiwvy (1928) 20: "On the whole, the course of history has been to
wrest legislative power from the executive (except in the form of administrative
regulations issued under delegation from the legislature) and to require for public
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One phase of this conflict is represented in the demand that adjudi-
cation between individuals or groups and between citizens and the state
(subjects and Crown) should be performed by an agency as disinter-
ested in the particular controversy as possible. Thus arose the separa-
tion of powers doctrine and the intensely held Anglo-American doctrine
of judicial independence from the political process and executive con-
trol. The illusory aspects of constitutionalism in the United States
have long obscured the true nature of the judicial process and have led
the unsuspecting citizen to a profound faith in the impartiality of
judges-a faith unjustified by works, especially in the realm of judicial
policy-making.
The flow of power represented in the struggle just referred to, has
been reversed. Under the physis8 of political evolution in modern states
a different compulsion clothed in modified doctrines has appeared. We
now have the simple division of the powers of government into politics
and administration.7 The expression of popular opinion, or the com-
promise of conflicting interest groups, culminates in the legislative ex-
pression of policy-law. Administration effectuates the policy deter-
mined upon and administrative agencies and courts share, to some de-
gree, in both processes. The executive, directly (formally in England)
or indirectly, is becoming ever more aggressive in the determination of
policy. In England the formal structure of the cabinet system combined
with the incapacity of parliament to legislate on modern complex prob-
lems and the subservience of members of parliament to party discipline,
has made it possible to speak of the dictatorship of the cabinet. 8 And
welfare enactments the same concurrence of organs of popular representation,
that, at some time or other, has almost everywhere in Europe been required for
changes in the law of civil and criminal justice. Instead of codes superseding
unwritten law, we find, in public law, statutes superseding proclamations and de-
crees."
' Briefly, that natural force which compels the acorn to produce only an oak
tree. See MYREs, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE GREEKS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
To EARLY NOTIONS ABOUT LAW, AUTHORITY, AND NATURAL ORDER IN RELATION
TO HUMAN ORDINANCE (1927).
'HART, THE ORDINANCE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (1928) 28: "Under that
scheme governmental activity is said to be divisible into two and only two dis-
tinct phases. These are variously distinguished as the expression and carrying
out of the will of the state; as the formation and the enforcement of the com-
mands of the state; as the creation and the execution by the state of legal rights
and duties; and as the enactment and the administration by the state of general
rules of conduct." See HAINES AND HAINES, PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF
GOVERNMENT (1934), especially c. XVIII; MUIR, How BRITAIN IS GOVERNED
(1930) Part I, c. I; WADE AND PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1931).
"BLACK, Tan RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE PoWER To LEGISLATION (1919),
quoting I LOWELL, GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1919) 326: "'To say that at
present the cabinet legislates with the advice and consent of Parliament would
hardly be an exaggeration; and it is only the right of private members to bring
in a few motions and bills of their own, and to criticize government measures, or
propose amendments to them, freely, that prevents legislation from being the work
of a mere automatic majority'."
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the cabinet itself has found it necessary to bow to the judgment of the
permanent administrator on technical, legislative, and policy problems. 9
In the United States, the problem of delegation of powers has char-
acteristically 'been imbedded in terminological confusion. A disposition
to adhere rigidly to the separation of powers doctrine (coupled with
the efforts of particularistic interests to manipulate the doctrine to their
own advantage) has resulted in a plethora of definition, counter-defini-
tion and fiction. Such problems have been adequately treated by other
writers.10 So also, it has been well established that legislative power
may constitutionally be delegated-whether under cover of the term
"quasi-legislative," or simply as a "necessary" delegation." And Pro-
fessor Hart has amply demonstrated the quantitative and substantive
delegation of legislative power at past periods in our history.'2
B. THME NEcEsSITY FOR THE DELEGATION OF POWERS
Equally demonstrable is the necessity for the delegation of admin-
istrative discretion.' 3 It is necessary in physical terms because of the
incapacity of congress to handle the mass of detail which would other-
wise be thrown upon it.'4 It is necessary because of the nature of the
0 WILLIs, THE PARLIAMENTARY PowERs oF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPART-
M.NTS (1933) especially p. 34. See also BLACK, op. Cit. supra note 8.
" HART, op. cit. supra note 7; CoMER, LFGISLATIVE FuNcToNs OF NATIONAL
ADmiNISTRATrvE AUTHORITmS (1927); BLACHLY AND OATMAN, ADmINISTRATIVE
LEGISLATION AND ADjUDICATION (1934) 20: "A rule or regulation which effects
the rights, liberty, property, or conduct of citizens which is made in correct form
and through the proper methods, by an authority empowered to make it, and which
can be enforced by some sort of judicial authority, is an act legislative in nature."
' HART, op. cit. supra note 7 at pp. 34, 56, 132; ComER, op. cit. supra note 10 at
33-34; Cousens, The Delegation of Federal Legislative Powers to Executive Offi-
cials (1935), 33 MIcH. L. REv. 512, and cases cited therein. At page 538, Cousens
concludes: "(1) Wherever a question has arisen as to the validity of the delega-
tion of alleged legislative power it has been uniformly upheld, and (2) Powers
which have been held non-legislative for .the purpose of upholding their delega-
tion have for other purposes in other cases (and sometimes in the same case)
been held to be legislative or quasi-legislative. This is notably true of powers of
regulation as applied to public utilities."
" HAR, op. cit. supra note 7 at 72 et seq., and cases cited therein. For exam-
ples of delegation in England, see DIMocx, BRITISH PuBLic UTILITIES (1934)
29, 38, 58.
' WILLS, op. cit. supra note 9 at 49: "When, however, the phrase 'administra-
tive discretion' is used in contra-distinction to 'legislative discretion' it is supposed
to mean a discretion which is of the same nature as legislative discretion, but to
be exercised in matters of detail and pursuant to the general order."
"' HART, op. cit. supra note 7 at 127: ". . . it is easy to demonstrate the ad-
visability if not absolute necessity of leaving at least the details of our complex
social and industrial legislation to that branch of government which rubs elbows
with the actual problems and can deal with them in a more direct and more flexi-
ble way than the legislature can."
WiLLIs, op. cit. supra note 9 at 175: "'But in truth whether good or bad the
development of the practice is inevitable. It is a natural reflection, in the sphere
of constitutional law. of changes in our ideas of government which have resulted
from changes in political, social, and economic ideas, and of changes in the cir-
cumstances of our lives which have resulted from scientific discoveries.' " Quot-
ing the Donoughmore Committee.
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legislative process in attempting the regulation of certain complex activ-
ities. That is, neither the legislature nor the administrative agency can
know what the interrelations of rule and activity will require until the
process of regulation is actually under way. Then it is necessary to
adapt, contract, expand, diversify the application of rules or of specific
adjustments in order to "rationalize" the total regulative situation.15
This process is evident in the functioning of any large administrative
agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade
Commission, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, Farm Credit Administration, and so on. When the agency,
of its own judgment or because of judicial restrictions, feels the need of
additional powers in making these adjustments, it makes recommenda-
tions to congress requesting the additional legislation. Thus the legis-
lative rule arrived at becomes a generalization of administrative ex-
perience.
CousENs, supra note 11 at 515-516: "'There are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking
power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside
the halls of legislation."' Quoting Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694- 12
$up. Ct. 495, 505, 36 L. ed. 294, 310 (1892).
Freund, op. cit. supra note 5 at 126: "The regulation of railroad rates en-
tirely through administrative action, is in the first instance due to inherent diffi-
culties of legislative specification; but it is also clear that the method chosen
represents a process of rationalization. The special feature of the administrative
power is that it is exclusively one of corrective intervention. The rate structure
proceeds from the initiative of the carrier, and the state or its agency has no pri-
mary responsibility for the resulting system; and it is hardly conceivable that
merely corrective action will produce entire reconstruction; the process of ration-
alization does not therefore involve standardization de novo; moreover, since there
is no delegation for regulation but only for particular orders, administrative action
is not called upon to formulate explicit rules; and theories will appear only as
reasons for decisions. . . .All deferred control, operating under guaranties of
procedure and subject to judicial review, is in this sense a method of rationaliza-
tion, and in this the growth of administrative law reflects the effort or tendency
of legislative regulation to conform to rational standards."
Professor Milton Handler has expressed a different view with regard to the
Federal Trade Commission: "The definition of unfair competition by administra-
tive legislation is incomparably superior to definition by administrative decision.
The method of judicial exclusion and inclusion does not permit of a sustained,
consistent, comprehensive and speedy attack upon the trade practice problem. The
case by case determination takes years to cover even a narrow field; it leaves wide
lacunae; false starts are difficult to correct and the erroneous decision is just as
prolific as a sound ruling in begetting a progeny of subordinate rules. In a con-
troversy between two litigants or between a Commission and a private party, the
law making functioh is distracted by factors which are important td the contest-
ants but irrelevant to the formulation of future policy. The fusion of law and
economics, the detailed investigations and hearings, and the precise formulation
of rules, all of which are so essential to a proper regulation of competition, are
not feasible when law making is but a by-product of the adjustment of contro-
versies. The combination of the two functions may have been justified when
knowledge of the workings of competition was sparse and objectives ill-defined.
It can no longer be justified today. It would be little short of criminal to rely
upon so inefficient a method of law making when more scientific and expeditious
devices are available." Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 259.
. From both points of view, the problem is one of division within the administra-
tive organization rather than between congress and administration.
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One might summarize the necessity for and advisability of such ad-
ministrative discretion by listing its advantages:
1. Legislatures and committees cannot possibly achieve the intimate
knowledge necessary to handle the problems involved.
2. Legislatures are slow in action, in adapting legislation to changed
conditions or unforeseen circumstances; they meet infrequently.
3. The legislature can lay down only a rigid rule-and the more
rigid, the more ministerial must administration become.
4. Permanence and continuity result from administrative effort;
legislatures are notoriously fickle.
5. Administration is in a better position to employ scientific and ex-
pert help.
6. If the legislature is freed from concern with details it can devote
more attention to policy.16
7. Administration can adapt government to local or regional varia-
tions.
8. Administration can make continuous adjustment to future condi-
tions unknown to the legislature at the-time it acts.
9. Detailed legislation is politically more difficult to enact.1 7
10. It permits an experimental approach.' 8
That this necessary delegation has occurred in the past and that it
has been sustained by the courts is evident from numerous studies and
decisions. 19 More recent delegations, at least in the eyes of the Amer-
ican Bar Association Special Committee, go much further. This com-
mittee, for its own purposes, has set up a fourfold classification:
"1. Congress enacts a rule of conduct and delegates to an admin-
istrative agency the power to determine when the rule shall go into
effect or shall cease to have effect.
"2. Congress delegates to an administrative agency, already existing
or definitely established by statute, the power to make rules of conduct
(usually referred to as "regulations").
"3. Congress not only delegates to an Eidministrative agency the
power to make rules of conduct (regulations) but also the power to
subdelegate that power, and to create, establish, determine the character
of, and discontinue, agencies to exercise the subdelegated power.
"4. Congress not only delegates to an administrative agency the
power to make rules of conduct (regulations) and the power to sub-
"- The first six are based largely on HA:R, op. cit. supra note 7 at 275-281, who
follows Freund.
" 7. 8 and 9 are suggested in Comza, op. cit. supra note 10 at 16, footnote.
"The Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers to Parliament (1932)
included most of the points listed, and this last one in addition.
Disadvantages include: (1) Less public control over administration; adminis-
trative action not preceded by public discussion. (2) Legislatures know better
what is politically expedient. (3) Legislative acts have a higher moral authority
than those of the administrative arm. (4) Executive legislation may be affected
by the spoils system, inefficiency, red tape, rigidity, and the like.
FR9UND, op. cit. supra note 5 at 220-221, finds the main difference between
legislative and administrative rule-making to be that the latter, in America, is
practically unregulated whereas the former must.pass a series of political checks.
11 See notes 11 and 12, supra.
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delegate that power, but also the power to determine, put in force, and
discontinue, the system of regulation to be used in enforcing the rules
thus enacted. '20
The first and second are traditional types of delegation and of those
two only the second is really a delegation of legislative discretion. The
third and fourth forms are, in the committee's eyes, extreme. They
are the forms employed more by the New Deal than by any other ad-
ministration. And such delegations have been made to federal govern-
ment corporations.
C. DELEGATIONS AFFECTING CORPORATIONS
What sort of delegation is made to the president and administra-
tive agencies relative to government corporations ?21 In the first place,
where such corporations have 'been created by congress, the basic struc-
tural outline is set down by the creating act.22 But where power to
create a corporation, or power to create a suitable agency including
a corporation, is granted to the president, then the general form and
specific powers are determined by the president's executive order.
23
or by the administrative agency to whom he redelegates this power.
2 4
Naturally, where an administrative agency creates a corporation by
chartering it in a state, with either the formal or informal consent of
the president, the form, powers and duties of such corporation are
determined by the creating agency although possibly colored as to func-
tions by the act or acts under which authority to create it is claimed.25
- 61 A. B. A. REP. 720, 774 (1936).
"On one phase of the problem see Note, Delegation to Judicial Bodies of
Power to Supervise Organization of Public Corporations (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
413, commenting on Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N. W. 464 (1929).
Corporations such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Home Owners
Loan Corporation, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
'Such as the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., the United States Grain Corpo-
ration, the Export-Import Bank of Washington. Even in these cases the presi-
dent may redelegate much discretion to subordinates. Executive Order No. 6581
directing the creation of the Export-Import Bank states in one paragraph: "The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are hereby authorized and
directed to cause said corporation to be formed, with such certificate of incorpora-
tion and bylaws, as they shall deem requisite and necessary to define the methods
by which the corporation shall conduct its -business."
'As in the United States Housing Corporation, the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration, the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation, and others.
2For example, the Commodity Credit Corporation, while having wide charter
powers, is self-limited by its bylaws to dealing in commodities indicated by the
president. Many such corporations were chartered in Delaware whose general
corporation laws permit the vesting of power to make and alter bylaws in the
board of directors (DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §2044), and permit the corporation
itself to amend its own certificate of incorporation in almost any manner it sees
fit (DEL. Rv. CODE (1935) §2058). The standard certificate of incorporation
forms sent out by the various companies rendering incorporation services in
Dover, invariably cover those two points and the charters of those government
corporations incorporated in Delaware contain these clauses. In the Commodity
Credit Corporation charter the provisions may be found in clauses 9 and 12.
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In practically all such delegations, the administrative agency which
creates the corporation and determines its powers and duties, also con-
trols the corporation.20 Even where the corporation is created by execu-
tive order, the order is prepared by subordinates-those who are to be
its managers probably27-and submitted to the president for approval.
In effect, then, in a large number of cases the legislative function of
creating an administrative agency which at one time would have been
performed in some detail by congress, is delegated to the president, or
through his discretion, to some administrative agency. The rights and
duties of employees of such corporations are thus largely at the dis-
cretion of the corporation itself or those designated to manage it. Even
in those corporations created by act of congress a free reign over per-
sonnel is given to the board of directors save perhaps for a limitation
as to top salaries, 28 a requirement that a list of employees and their
salaries be reported to congress, 29 or that certain restrictions apply to
certain types of positions. 30
D. DELEGATIONS TO CORPORATIONS
With the exception of corporations made subject to a supervisory
authority, such authority bearing the burden of carrying out the sub-
stantive provisions of the acts of congress under which the corporations
function,3 1 government corporations are relatively free to determine
their own procedure. This included freedom in methods of accounting
and audit at first, but many corporations have been made subject to the
general accounting office.32 There may be special limitations on cer-
tain items such as issuing bonds, 33 purchasing,3 4 disposal of property,3 5
etc.
' This was true of many of the war-time corporations-the United States
Housing Corporation, United States Grain Corporation, and others, and is true
of many existing corpoiations such as the Federal Subsistence Homesteads
Corporation, Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, Electric Home and Farm Au-
thority, Reconstruction Finance Corporation-Mortgage Company and Warrior
River Terminal Company.
' As in the case of the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation. See
Glick, The Federal Subsistence Homestead Program (1936) 44 YALE L. 3. 1324.
' As, for example, in the Home Owners Loan Corporation Act, 48 STAT. 128
(1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §1463(j) (1934).
' As in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 STAT. 63 (1933), 16 U. S.
C. A. §831h(a) (1934).
'Such as officers residing in the districts in which they work. See Home
Owners Loan Corporation Act, 49 STAT. 296 (1935), 12 U. S. C. A. §1463(j)
(1936).
' As in the Farm Credit Administration and the Federal Home Loan Bank
System. ' By Executive Order No. 6540.
'Subject to the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury in practically all
cases.
"As, for example, affecting the Tennessee Valley Authority, 49 STAT. 1080
(1935), 16 U. S. C. A. §831h(b) (Supp. 1937).
'The Tennessee Valley Authority, 49 STAT. 1075, 1076, 1080 (1935), 16
U. S. C. A. §831c(k) (Supp. 1937); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
49 STAT. 684 (1935), 12 U. S.- C. A. §264(n) (1) (1936).
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Hence, though the substantive functions of a corporation may be
limited quite definitely to certain specific operations such as making a
certain type of loan to home owners, or operating a barge line over a
definite inland waterway, the corporations are generally endowed with
wide discretion as to how they shall organize their operations below the
board of directors and as to the methods they will pursue. The greatest
restrictions appear in the Farm Credit Administration and Federal
Home Loan Bank Board groups. This discretion may be called "ad-
ministrative discretion" though much of such activity was once per-
formed by the congress and was thought of as a legislative function.
A fundamental aspect of legislative power is that it is used in the
making of a general rule-a rule which is a legal statement of policy.
The policy may be to raise revenue by this or that type of taxation,
to regulate the conduct of citizens along this or that line, or to spend
money in performing a service for citizens for which there may or may
not be a specific charge. That is, a tariff or income tax law, a food
and drug or securities and exchange act, a post office or national parks
act, are all legal statements of policies which congress chooses to follow.
To what extent do government corporations have this power of policy-
determination? There is in the government corporation comparatively
little of the power to tell one class of citizens how they must behave
toward another class of citizens in private operations. That is, a cor-
poration would not be ordering railroads not to pay rebates to shippers
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission might.
A corporation may, however, declare that those who deal with it
must fulfill certain conditions. These conditions may involve any-
thing from filling out a simple application form to submitting to an in-
vestigation as to one's moral character (Home Owners Loan Corpora-
tion), or buying a ticket (on the Panama Rail Road) to being told
what management policies to pursue (Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Savings Loan
Insurance Corporation, ete.), And they may involve the persuasive
regulation of the conduct of creditors and debtors toward each other
(Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Home Owners Loan Corpora-
tion, Farm Credit Administration, and other credit agencies), or of
buyers and sellers toward each other (Tennessee Valley Authority).
It is not customarily thought that such determinations of policy are
regulatory because whether or not a citizen deals with a government
corporation is a matter of his own choice. If he chooses to use its ser-
vice, then he must submit to its conditions.
This choice is not present, for example, to the railroad. It must
submit, willy-nilly, to the Interstate Commerce Commission. If a cor-
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poration chooses to go into the railroad business, it must get the con-
sent of the Interstate Commerce Commission first. The only way for
the citizen who works for or has an interest in a railroad to avoid the
influence of the Interstate Commerce Commission is to get out of rail-
roading entirely, do no travelling and no shipping -on the railroads.
Even then, as long as he remains a part of our economic organism,
he will find it difficult to escape the influence of fundamental policies
pursued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rate structure
constructed by the Commission is universally influential. This is why
any reasonably logical view must conclude that the Interstate Commerce
Commission exercises legislative discretion.
How does the situation between the government corporation and
the citizen differ from that of citizen and Interstate Commerce Com-
mission? A citizen who operates a business entitled to borrow from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation is under no legal compulsion to
borrow from it. Nor must a citizen ride on the Panama Rail Road,
buy Tennessee Valley Authority power, ship on the Inland Waterways
Corporation barges, or buy electrical equipment through the Electric
Home and Farm Authority. That is, there is no legal compulsion to do
these things.
If the citizen, however, finds himself in a position where he has no
feasible alternative but to use the service of the government corpora-
tion, if he must borrow from it or lose his home, farm, or business, then
the discretion to determine the conditions on which he may use such
service is distinctly regulative. It will be remembered that in the case
of Munn v. Illinois"6 the court in effect took the position that if the
citizen did not like the legislature's regulation of public utilities, he
could withdraw his property from such business or seek a political
remedy. The courts have since undertaken to protect the citizen's
property for him, but the point is pertinent.
If a citizen is in a position where he must seek a government serv-
ice or suffer an injurious loss, then he must qualify under the condi-
tions laid down or try to get those conditions altered. The more
monopolistic the government service is, the more subject to the regu-
lative effect of such conditions the citizen is. A man whose publication
has been excluded from the mails may substitute a messenger service if
he can afford it. But if the only thing standing between a corpora-
tion and bankruptcy, or an individual and mortgage foreclosure, is a
government loan, then there is little he can do but accept the terms.
My point simply is that the power to regulate conduct is not ex-
clusively limited to a legal rule prescribing what that conduct shall
"94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876).
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be but such regulation may be equally as effective through determining
the economic conditions or alternatives under which an individual may
act.37 This point is of fundamental importance if we contemplate a
continued expansion of the economic operations of government: if the
government becomes increasingly the dominating influence in determin-
ing banking policy, if the Tennessee Valley Authority is multiplied in
other valley areas, if the government enters more fully into the shipping
business. For the average citizen, the fundamental sameness of the
regulatory effects of a commission and a government corporation having
a monopoly or near-monopoly status can be seen if we consider sub-
stituting government ownership and operation of the railroads for
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation. Owners are eliminated
'but there will still be shippers, riders, and consumers generally (and
bondholders for a long time) vitally affected by railroad rate and serv-
ice policies.
E. EXTENT OF DELEGATION TO CORPORATIONS
The question now arises as to how much actual substantive policy-
determining discretion is exercised by government corporations in their
relations with the public. The discretion as to organization and per-
sonnel affects the public, of course, for it bears directly on the efficiency
of the agency. But in addition to this where is the line drawn between
congressional and corporate policy-determination?
In the big corporations-especially those dealing with credit-the sub-
stantive policy is largely laid down by congress. What sort of loans
are to be made to what class of borrowers with what maximum interest
rates and lengths of maturity, and from what funds, is prescribed by
congress. It is left to the corporation to interpret the act by determin-
ing the eligibility of the potential patron and his property, the specific
interest rate, the specific requirements as to collateral, the specific
amount of the loan in relation to the value of the property, and so on.
If it is an important legislative act for congress to say that class of
individuals A may borrow from the agency but class B or other classes
may not, it is also an important legislative act when the corporation in
determining what "adequate security," "moral character," "satisfactory
management," or proper standards of appraisal are, divides class A
into two subclasses one of which, by the corporation's own sub-legis-
lation, is excluded from its benefits.
' See Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of 'Political and Economic'
Co:pulsion (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV. 149. Public utility rates may be likened to
taxes: SWENSON, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BusiNEss (1924) 164, §190.
See also Justice Field's dissent in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21
L. ed. 384 (1873), and Justice Brandeis' dissent in Hitchrnan Coal & Coke Co.
v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 223, 38 Sup. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252 (1917). See CoMoNs,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) 12, 296.
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In the case of corporations originating in executive discretion and
chartered in a state or the District of Columbia, the determination of
such policies of operation as prices, interest rates, eligibility for loans,
standards of security, etc., depending on the nature of the corporation,
lie almost completely within the power of the corporations themselves.
By the terms of their corporate charters such corporations largely de-
termine their own powers, and as an examination of their charters will
show, 8 they have been most generous. It should, of course, be borne
in mind that most of these corporations are in reality only technically
corporations. The policies they pursue are determined by administra-
tors who are direct agents of the Government subject to political ap-
pointment and the general policies pursued by the administration.
With a corporation such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, policy-
determining discretion has a much wider scope, for it concerns itself
with a variety of economic activities and with a social planning and
activity that involves fundamental decisions of social policy. True it'is
that the congress has laid the general foundation of this policy-set
its general direction, but its effect on the people of the valley rests
largely on what policies the Authority adopts in carrying out its gen-
eral objective.
It may be said, therefore, that government corporations exercise as
much if not more "administrative" independence than regular bureaus
and departments, and that they combine with this power over their
own organization and personnel a substantial rule-making or policy-
determining power affecting in varying degrees the welfare of citizens.
They do not tax, but they may determine (within limits for some of
them) what citizens pay for a Government service (taxes are actually
that-a compulsory payment for government services) and though
they do not exercise a power of legal compulsion generally, they may
determine conditions which by force of economic compulsion regulate
the lives of large classes of citizens.
F. DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWERS TO CORPORATIONS
Do they also exercise judicial power? That is, do they sit in judg-
ment over rights and duties in conflict? Here also the corporations
exercise an effective power which does not exactly fit the traditional
categories. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for example, may
exercise a very effective influence over the conflict of creditor interests
in a railroad by the conditions it lays down before the railroad can ob-
tain a loan either to save it from bankruptcy or to facilitate a reorgani-
"Especially the state-chartered corporations such as the Commodity Credit
Corporation, the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, the Federal Subsistence
Homesteads Corporation, and others whose certificates of incorporation are re-
produced in 79 CONG. a~c. 1549-1561 (1935).
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zation to get out of bankruptcy. As illustrated in the case of the
Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad,9 though a railroad must gain the
consent of 'both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation before obtaining a Reconstruction Finance
Corporation loan, what the Reconstruction Finance Corporation thinks
is a proper adjustment of interests in the reorganization plan may be
and frequently is the determining factor.
In all cases where the service is rendered only after proof of eli-
gibility, the corporation exercises a judicial procedure in determining
whether or not an individual applicant is eligible. It lays down, first,
general rules as to standards of appraisal, management, moral charac-
ter, etc., and then sits in judgment on each individual applicant to see
whether or not he qualifies. And his right to the service will depend
on the decision rendered by the corporation or its agents.
This may be carried further. A corporation may determine whether
or not the conditions on which an applicant has been given service have
been violated and may suspend such service, usually after hearing, but
on its own decision. 40  Thus, though the corporation does not exercise
the power to fine or imprison, it may very effectively penalize what it
considers to be a violation of its own rules, or conditions laid down
in its conttact with a patron.
judgment on applications is final. The corporation may allow an
appeal from a subordinate to a superior, but even this is within its dis-
cretion.41 There can be no appeal to the courts. Where there has been
a definite contract, abrogation by the corporation may give the citizen
a right of judicial review. But even here the Tennessee Valley
Authority contracts provide for unilateral abrogation by the Tennessee
Valley Authority on its own judgment.42 And the insured status of an
institution may be abrogated by the insuring agency at its discretion if
certain procedures are followed.43  Other illustrations might be given.
Violations of the criminal provisions with which congress has sur-
rounded the corporations or a specific corporation, will, of course, be
prosecuted in the' regular courts. Such processes as mortgage fore-
closure are likewise for the courts.
'Hearings before the Subconmittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce on the Proposed Sale of the Minneapolis and St, Louis Railroad, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
'As in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 49 STAT. 684 (1935), 12
U. S. C. A. §264(i) (1936), and in the Tennessee Valley Authority, 48 STAT. 64
(1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831i (1934).
'Home Owners Loan Corporation, Field Manual, c. 7, p. 2.
, Such provisions in the contracts are authorized by the Act, 48 STAT. 64
(1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831i (1934).
' Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 49 STAT. 684 (1935), 12 U. S.
C. A. §264(i) (1936); Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 48
STAT. 1260, 12 U. S. C. A. §1730(b) (1934).
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The government corporation combines the powers of government into
a single agency. It combines the function of making rules with the
function of carrying them out and, to some degree, with the power to
sit in judgment on their violation. A government corporation may
have a board of directors functioning as a policy-determining body with
a general manager and subordinates to administer its functions,4 or
it may combine both functions into the hands of one or two or three
individuals. 45 The problem of a separation or division of powers with-
in the corporation is important as a problem in administrative organi-
zation. But, as outlined above, the policies pursued by a government
corporation involve rule-making, rule-execution, and a judicial process
all subject, in general terms, to the controlling authority of the cor-
poration-the board of directors or administrator.4
G. DELEGATIONS WITHI1 COR"ORATIONS
Within a corporation there must obviously be a delegation of ad-
ministrative power-that is, of adapting organization and procedure to
the conditions of the function being carried out by the agency. This
may be a matter of interaction between the subordinate division and
the board of directors. It may be provided, for example, that a local
office shall hire such personnel as it needs within prescribed limits and
with the approval of the next higher division-perhaps a regional office
as in the case of the Home Owners Loan Corporation;47 and the re-
gional office may in turn hire its personnel with the approval of the
assistant general manager and the board.48  The importance of such
delegation lies largely in its influence on the efficiency of the organi-
zation. It is a problem we need not deal with here.
But there is also a delegation of discretion affecting the interests of
the public--especially patrons. This is particularly true in a loan-
making agency such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the
Farm Credit Administration agencies, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board agencies. The appraisals of character, management, property,
and collateral must largely be made by the personnel of local agencies
"As is true of the Home Owners Loan Corporation, Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, and others.
As in the Inland Waterways Corporation, or in the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority to begin with. Recently the Tenneessee Valley Authority Board has
been increasingly confining itself to policy-determining.
"The reader should bear in mind two things: (1) the writer is looking at
the exercise of government power in its effect on the conduct of citizens whether
that power appears in the form of a legal rule coercing the individual by law
or a statement of economic policy under conditions which regulate the individual's
conduct. (2) The court decisions affecting either of these points as regards gov-
ernment corporations are scant and do not define the problem in terms of judicial
review.
'Home Owners Loan Corporation, Field Manual, c. 1, p. 3.8 Id. at 2.
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who meet the applicant and inspect his property. So also is it true
of agencies that must conduct examinations of financial condition in-
volving appraisals of loans, business conditions, and management, such
as the above named agencies, and in addition the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
The delegation here is not so much of the nature of legislative as of
judicial power. Appraisers, for the most part, follow forms and apply
rules. Additional rules or modifications of existing rules may grow
out of their work, but such are made by the head of the division at least
if not by the board of directors itself. But it is on the work and recom-
mendation of the appraiser that, the decision to accept or reject the
applicant is made by the individual or committee having that power.
The process of examination and appraisal, as a process, is but little
different whether it is conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, or corporations such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or the Home Owners
Loan Corporation. Rights and duties flow from the results of such a
process in all such cases. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board may
suspend a member of a Home Loan Bank, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation may suspend an insured non-member -bank, or close a
member bank; the Farm Credit Administration may do likewise to mem-
bers of the Banks for Co-operatives, and so on, as a result of examina-
tion and appraisal procedures.
The power of rejection usually lies with the local agency though
acceptance of an applicant may require superior approval in all doubtful
cases 49 and, in some corporations, in all cases. 0 And when a matter
goes higher up for approval, the facts are furnished by the subordinate
and his recommendations carry great weight. In fact specific knowl-
edge is almost inevitably dependent on the local investigation. 5 ' The func-
tions of appraisal and examination are discretionary functions. Assum-
ing good faith in the appraiser or examiner, the only recourse a dis-
satisfied applicant has is to appeal to a superior-and that involves at
least an implied impeachment of the examiner and of the institution
which employs him. There could be no judicial review of such dis-
cretion.52
'Id. c. 7 at 2.I As in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
See the testimony of Jesse Jones in the Hearings on the Minneapolis & St.
Louis Railroad supra note 39.
1 Wehle, Government-Controlled Business Corporations i; America and Europe
(1935) 10 TULANE L. REv. 94, 95: "When, for instance, a governmentally incor-
porated lending body acts favorably or unfavorably upon an application for a loan,
let us say, upon a highly-processed milk-powder, on the theory that it is or is not
an 'agricultural product' within the meaning of a statute, that government corpora-
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H. TH . CONTROL OF ADmINiSTRATION-J DICIAL
The problem of control of administrative action begins with the
statute.53 The vaguer the language of the statute, the less the control-
or the more general the objectives and standards set by congress, the
more leeway the administrator has.54 The first step in enforcing a
statute is interpreting or construing it. 5 The first to make such inter-
pretation after the act is passed is the administrative agency delegated
to carry it out. As problems arise, are met, solved, the process of inter-
pretation goes on: it is continuous.5 Likewise the subordinate must
interpret the rules laid down 'by his superior. An examiner must, for
example, interpret the standards laid down as to what is or is not a
"good" loan.
This interpretation of statute and rule is of fundamental importance.
It is of importance on several grounds. First, because most such ad-
ministrative interpretation is accepted without question by the citizen
tion has interpreted the statute, and has acted finally upon that interpretation, in
such a way as precludes any appeal; whereas the Constitution seems to contemplate
that such a decision should be made upon definite findings by a delegated ad-
ministrative body whose decision will 'be reviewable by the Courts."
I BLACHLY AND OATMAXr, o,. cit. supra note 10 at 260, 286. "'The legislature
should fix the main outlines of organization, and lay down the most important
norms, standards, and methods for carrying on the various functions of govern-
ment."
'The Supreme Court -rejected indefinite standards in two cases but did not
do much toward indicating how definite a standard must 'be. See Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 79 L. ed. 446 (1931); Schechter v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570 (1935). See Jacoby,
Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review: A Study in Comparative Law, (1936)
36 CoL. L. Rav. 871.
An interesting controversy centering around the problem of construing an
act of congress appears in United States Sugar Equilization Board, Inc. v. P.
De Ronde & Co., Inc., 7 F. (2d) 981, 987 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925). "It may be that
President Harding thought that this resolution was permissive, but the President,
like the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other executive or administrative offi-
cer, has to construe every act passed by Congress to be enforced by him. Such
construction is not final, and may be judicially reviewed at the instance of those
injuriously affected thereby, . . ." But most such construction never reaches the
courts.
' BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 10 at 41: "All this means that the
legislative process, as we have said above, may be a continuous process starting
from the most fundamental law and continuing down to the most minute regu-
lation or rule. It may be performed ,by constituent bodies, legislative bodies,
administrative bodies, administrative judicial bodies, and even judicial bodies.
The scope and significance of any action legislative in nature performed by each
type of authority depends upon several factors: The extent and method of legis-
lative delegation; the different methods by which the legislature permits the ad-
ministrative or executive authorities to implement the law; the extent to which
the administration must fill in the law in order to make it applicable, the amount
of control exercised by the courts over this process; the degree to which the ad-
ministration is left free to interpret the law; the extent to which the courts, in
settling cases 'before them, must fill in the omissions or gaps of the law; the extent
to which the courts make the statutory laws and regulations conform to their
common law concepts; and the extent to which the courts, under the guise of in-
terpreting the law, establish norms, rules, regulations, and classifications that are
legislative or administrative in nature."
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even where it is potentially reviewable by a court.6 7 Secondly, because
the spirit or philosophy of the administrators may vary widely the
effect of such administration.58 This is as true in a regular depart-
ment, 9 of course, as in a corporation. Should "adequate security" be
interpreted to mean highly liquid security? 0 Should a "good" loan be
thought of only as a relatively liquid loan ?61 What moral factors shall
determine the eligibility of an applicant for a Home Owners Loan
Corporation loan?62 Should the Tennessee Valley Authority drive as
sharp a bargain as possible in applying eminent domain? 63
"FRKuND, op. cit. supra note 5 at 179: "Where a statute depends for its exe-
cution and enforcement upon administrative action, executive interpretation is an
important factor. For, although ultimate judicial interpretation may be inde-
pendent, yet much of statutory execution never goes through the courts, and in
the enforcement of criminal statutes a lenient attitude of law-enforcing author-
ities must as a rule be conclusive. German and French legislation is overlaid by
executive instruction to an extent unknown in England and America, but even in
our jurisprudence the opinions of law officers advising executive departments in
many cases practically determine the operation of statutes."
'WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 9 at 57: "Bare quotation from statutes can be
oddly misleading. The words of grant are not in themselves important; it is the
action taken under them which should as a practical matter decide the case for or
against such delegation. But action is determined by the attitude of mind of the
actor."
' CoiEE, op. cit. supra note 10 at 142-143: "An engineer, member of the tech-
nical staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue upon being questioned as to whether
the large number of rulings on Section 214(a) of the Revenue Act of 1921 had
materially changed the effect of that Section upon taxpayers, answered in the
affirmative. An expert public accountant, formerly an employee of the Treasury
Department and later an adviser in making the rulings that deal with amortiza-
tion claims, stated before the Senate Committee that the Bureau had a progressive
policy which is followed in interpreting the law, a policy of progressing from
conservatism to liberalism. Regulations were harsh, he said, under the new law
in order to discourage excessive claims for amortization, but later were amended
to favor the taxpayer. He claimed that to interpret the law so as to favor the
government and to permit modification later if the taxpayer could prove that the
original interpretation was incorrect was the proper course for tax officials to
follow. The taxpayer must then proceed to show the Bureau that its ruling was
not the true interpretation of the intent of Congress, and eventually may ask the
opinion of the Judiciary. One of the more experienced attorneys of the legal
division of the Bureau was greatly pleased over the ability of his organization
to exceed the collection estimates of the government actuary for 1920 by a third
of a billion dollars, especially since the collections for 1919 had fallen short of the
estimate for that year by over a million. He explained the 1920 excess chiefly
on the basis of 'harsh' interpretative regulations in favor of the government. He
even went so far as to cite specific examples which the makers felt were actual
substantive changes in the law, saying that these, if they should happen to be con-
tested, would hardly prevail in the courts." This information came from personal
interview ,by Comer.
'Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 47 STAT. 6 (1932), 48 SrAT. 121
(1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §§605, 605b (1934). See also HARDY AND VINER, REPORT
ON THE AvArLADIrir" OF BANK CREDIT IN THE SEVENTH FEDERAL RESERVE Dis-
mier (1935), especially "Findings" 6 and 7, p. (vi), "Recommendations" 9-19,
pp. (vii-viii), and §VII, "Loans Made by the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion," pp. 39-47, wherein the authors discuss both interpretation and the delegation
of discretion within the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
*'As Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation examiners must decide.
'Home Owners Loan Corporation, Field Manual, c. 4, p. 8.
' Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 STAT. 60, 67, 70 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A.
§831 (e, q, x) (1934).
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In the third place there are the interpretations which are suffi-
ciently substantive in character to be laid alongside the language of the
statute and tested as to whether or not there is a conflict between the
two. Thus where the administrator can be charged with the violation of
a rule or statute either by doing what it forbids or by exceeding the
powers which it grants, then the citizen may submit himself to the
mercies of judicial review-a process by no means free from this same
element of interpretation.6 4  And also, as in the case-of review of acts
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it is a process in which fre-
quently a set of legal experts reverse a set of economic experts in mat-
ters quite distinctly within the province of the latter.
Control of administrative action 'by judicial review has been mostly
exercised in connection with the regulatory activities of government.
Where a civil employee or official exceeds statutory authority he may
be checked by appeal to the courts even though acting under orders from
a superior,65 and where a duty is ministerial, court action may compel
performance . 6  Where the action on the part of the administrator in-
volves not only interpretation of rule but determination of facts, the
relation of such action to judicial review is even more difficult to define.
A definite set of rules has been laid down by the Supreme Court with
regard to the Interstate Commerce Commission which permits the Court
to judge for itself when it may go behind the facts determined by the
Commission."
The Court resists the idea that final determination of facts may be
FaxuND, op. cit. supra note 5 at 95: "It is not entirely improper to speak
of the hazard of judicial construction; for construction is in the nature of a
sovereign act and unpredictable.. . .A full examination of cases, while valuable
for practical purposes, would yield only a demonstration of the impossibility of
laying down reliable rules of construction."
'WATKINS, TH.- STATE AS PARTY LITIGANT (1927) 110: "Accordingly the
orders of a superior, even of the President, afford no defense to an officer if in
law his act is unjustified. ...The interpretation of law by the heads of the
Departments will be of great persuasive weight before the courts, but if such
interpretation is in fact erroneous, the instructions of the Department heads offer
no defense to the inferior officers in a suit against them."
A general summary of administrative actions liable to question in a court
is made by HART, op. cit. supra note 7 at 306-308.
1." .. in cases thus far decided, it has been settled that the orders of the Com-
mission are final unless (1) beyond the power which it could constitutionally
exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law.
But questions of fact may be involved in the determination of questions of law, so
that an order, regular on its face, may be set aside if it appears that (4) the
rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against taking property without due process of law; or (5) if the Commis-
sion acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence or with-
out evidence to support it; or (6) if the authority therein involved has been exer-
cised in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary
rule that the substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise
of the power." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pac. R. R-, 222 U; S.
541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 111, 56 L. ed. 308, 311 (1912).
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left with an administrative agency.68 Part of the problem centers
around the definiteness of standards set by the legislature-that is, it is
a problem of interpretative discretion. How definite a standard must be
to permit judicial review is not dearly evident. 69 The functions of the
judiciary being largely self-limited in matters of fundamental policy,
what the courts may do by way of limiting administrative discretion
in the corporate form of administrative agency remains to be seen.70
"Case law," says Freund, "is a form of casuistry," though perhaps legi-
timate casuistry;71 and Professor Hart, in attempting to draw a line
between what congress should do itself and what it should delegate to a
commission or the president in regulating interstate commerce, suggests
that the grant of power over minimum and maximum rates had suffi-
Haines, Review of Industrial Accident Commissions, in Governmental Ad-
ministration Essays (1935) 148, footnote: "In relation to 'basic,' 'pivotal,' or
'jurisdictional' facts, Chief Justice Hughes said: 'It is the question whether the
Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of
the United States is vested, an administrative agency-in this instance a single
deputy commissioner-for the final determination of the existence of the facts
upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend.
The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the
investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and the support of
their authorized action, does not require the conclusion that there is no limitation
of their use, and that the Congress could completely oust the courts of all de-
terminations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in itt
instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That would be to sap the
judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a gov-
ernment of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental
rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as
to facts becomes in effect finality in law."' Quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22, 56, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 294, 76 L. ed. 598, 616 (1932).
e'FRETUND, op. cit. supra note 5 at 71: "If the law requires a structure or plan
to be safe, or a food product to be wholesome, some doubt may arise; but on
the whole there is in such a case an assumption that standards are sufficiently
certain to be passed upon in an objective manner; and the justification of a re-
fusal to certify will normally present a question of fact which if controverted
can be decided by a court.... That a standard is not sufficiently definite for penal
enforcement, does not necessarily mean that it is not sufficiently definite forjudicial control; and if readily controllable, the standard is a legislative, not an
administrative standard."
1°HART, op. cit. supra note 7 at 31: "The distinctive function of the judiciary
is the authoritative but non-discretionary determination of jurisdiction, or, in
other words, the final decision whether a given act or course of action of a private
person was (or, under a system of declaratory judgments, will be) within the
sphere of the legal competence of the performer or pursuer." See also Needham,
Judicial Determination by Administrative Commissions (1916) 10 Am. PoL. Scr.
Ray. 235-250.
For a comparison of judicial and bureaucratic personnel and decisions see
HART, TENURE OF OFFICE UNDER TE CO NrSrTUTON, A STUDY ix LAW AND Pun-
LIc POLxCY (1930) especially pp. 57 et seq.
The suggestion derived from the study of government corporations is that of
circumventing the courts by creating an instrument of social control which makes
it unnecessary to resort to the courts in order to protect rights in conflict where
major matters of policy are involved. The application of this suggestion, however,
will necessitate a thorough examination of the constitution, nature, and functions
of boards of directors.
7 FREUND, op. cit. supra note 5 at 5.
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ciently objective standards and that a more definite line should be left
to the cumulative effect of judicial decisions.7j 2
The control of the courts is, by accepted practice, reduced to a
minimum where relating to questions of privilege as distinguished from
questions of right.73 This applies to the admittance of immigrants to the
country, the use of federal lands, and similar "privileges." According
to the Supreme Court:
"Neither an injunction nor mandamus will lie against an officer
of the Land Department to control him in discharging an official duty
which requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion. . . . The
head of an executive department... in the administration of the vari-
ous ... concerns of his office is continually required to exercise judg-
ment and discretion. He must exercise his judgment in expounding the
laws . . . under which he is from time to time required to act ...
Whether he decided right or wrong, is not the question. Having juris-
diction to decide at all, he had necessarily jurisdiction, and it was his
duty to decide as he thought the law was, and the courts have no power
whatever under these circumstances to review his determination by
mandamus or injunction." 74
It would seem likely that much of the corporate activity carried on by
the agencies under discussion would be so considered and thus be
relatively free from judicial control.
It is not necessary to go further into this particular problem here.
It should be remarked, however, that constitutional rights are generally
thought of in terms of freedom from regulation 75-not in terms of
right to an economic service. If government develops large monopolis-
tic business services, the right of the citizen vis-a-vis government must
include the right to impartial service as well as the right to non-dis-
criminatory regulation.
I. THE CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION-POLITICAL
There is a further important control over administrative action-
that commonly termed political. Such control lies in congress and the
12HART, op. cit. supra note 7 at 146.
" BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 10 at 247-249.
' United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 324, 23
Su. Ct. 698, 701, 47 L. ed. 1074, 1078 (1903).
FREUND, op. cit. supra note 5 at 114: "In the first place, the courts have con-
strued constitutional liberty as meaning (to some extent) freedom from regula-
tion, and freedom from regulation, which elsewhere is at most a policy or prin-
ciple, may therefore in America become a right . . . In the second place, consti-
tutional law alters the nature of the problem of freedom as a legislative problem.
The legislature must accommodate itself to judicial doctrines of immunity from
regulation, and difficult borderline questions in that respect require solution. . . .
The nineteenth century is generally associated with economic theories opposed to
regulation . . . and in America impatience of restraint antedated its judicial ex-
pression by many years; indeed, the judicial expression was a protest against
legislative change, which in its turn reflected a change of public opinion favorable
to regulation."
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president in the form of the power of congress to reorganize, abolish,
or restrict the powers or finances of any government corporation; in
the pressure which may be brought through congress by this or that
interest;76 in the threat or actuality of investigation and publicity; in
the power of the president to appoint, remove, investigate, to initiate
congressional action, in some cases to reorganize or abolish the cor-
poration, or determine the funds available for it, and in his general
budgetary control where a corporation must come before congress for
an appropriation.T '
This political control, especially in the policy formed by the presi-
dent and his administration and as relating to corporate agencies of the
Government performing economic operations, is of the utmost impor-
tance. It affects personnel policies and freedom from patronage, the
nature of Government competition with business, whether Government
credit is used primarily to aid big business or the individual, and so on.
In matters affecting citizens as a class, this is the important control.
Bungling, inefficient, over-generous, or hard-boiled and parsimonious
administration cannot be reached through the courts. In other words,
the interest of the individual citizen will 'be best served (assuming major
lines of policy to have been determined) by the construction of an
administrative organization composed not only of capable persons, but
of persons having a sense of responsibility for the function government
is performing, a spirit of sympathetic understanding of the citizen's
position, and an esprit de corps among themselves. This may be fur-
thered by devices, probably administrative, to prevent individual ad-
ministrators from abusing their power or the patience of the public.
Something of the kind is contemplated by Professor Dimock who
has studied in detail the administrative organization and functioning of
the Panama Rail Road Company and the Inland Waterways Corpora-
tion, and to some extent the Tennessee Valley Authority. He has
also made an extensive study of British public utilities.
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"' HERRING, in PUBLIC ADmINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936) has
made a good study of this kind of pressure, but makes few if any references to
government corporations.
7 For a similar list see HART, op. cit. supra note 7 at 292-293. He also points
out that judicial action is absolutely limited in relation to political discretion.
p. 164-165.
" Dimock, Cmnitrol Over Administrative Action, in EssAYs ON THE LAW AND
PRAcrIcE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION (1935) 288-289: "The objects
of control over administrative action may be said to be these: 1. To prevent the
formation of a deepening gulf which may separate the public employees from the
citizenry. 2. To carry on public administration within the letter and spirit of the
law, excluding arbitrary or prejudiced action. 3. To test every action of an in-
dividual officer by its reaction upon the prestige and the integrity of the public
service. 4. To obtain efficiency and esprit de corps as a result of positive stand-
ards and through corporate responsibility rather than by fear of the taskmaster or
by means of external compulsion-in other words, progressively to supersede the
necessity of external controls by developing the internal or corporate discipline.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
J. SUMMARY
In summary it may be said that:
1. Large "administrative discretion" may de delegated by congress
to an administrative agency directly or through the president;
2. "Legislative discretion" may be delegated by congress to the
president, or to administrative agencies, and power to redelegate may
be given;
3. "Administrative adjudication" is also authorized by congress;
4. The exercise of administrative, legislative and judicial powers
by departments or regulatory administrative agencies may be dupli-
cated by government corporations in so far as the nature of their
functions may lead them to do so;
5. The primary regulative effect is attained by the government cor-
poration through the determination of economic alternatives to which
economic conditions may subject the citizen;
6. The government corporation (varying in degree with the specific
corporation) determines economic policy;
7. It devises rules and regulations and techniques for administer-
ing that policy;
8. It exercises a judicial function in determining the right (eligi-
bility under conditions prescribed by the corporation, or by the cor-
poration within the limits set by congress) of the applicant to receive
the government service, or to continue receiving such service;
9. The more nearly a monopoly the service performed by the
government corporation is, the more its determinations of policy and
conditions have a coercive effect;
10. The nature of the discretion exercised by a government cor-
poration results in little judicial control under traditional concepts and
practices;
11. The primary control is political and lies in:
(a) an adequately clear determination of general policy by
congress (in reality by executive leadership through con-
gress),
(b) the possession by the executive of clearly formulated ad-
ministrative policies as to both ends and means,
"The methods of control over administrative action . . . are these: 1. The
investigation of administrative officials by legislative committees. 2. Judicial
control as effected by suits or by the application of remedies such as certiorari,
habeas corpus, and mandamus. 3. Administrative hearings by higher officials and
the exercise of disciplinary employees' associations as a means of guiding and
regulating individual conduct. 5. The establishment of objectives and of canons
of conduct for administrative officials by dictatorships, such as Italian, German,
or Russian."
Professor Dimock thinks that administrative self-regulation is the coming
method.
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(c) responsible and capable personnel with an esprit de corps
founded on the ideal of their function,
(d) properly devised administrative techniques for discover-
ing and correcting individual errors in administrative con-
duct;
12. Assuming an adequate administrative organization, the real prob-
lem of control will center in policy-determining-the relation of the
board of directors of the corporation to the real interests involved in
the operations of the agency (consumer or patron, labor (personnel),
competitors) and the general interest as represented in the national-
policy-determining body, congress7 9
This essay has constituted a review of the problem of delegation of
powers with the idea of setting the government corporation in the
currently accepted terms of that problem. It must be clear to the
reader that the questions raised by this discussion cannot be answered
without some consideration of the corporation as a separate entity and
the extent to which its proper and successful functioning may depend
on independence from, rather than subjection to, control by other
governmental agencies. The problems of the independence of govern-
ment corporations and their true nature as instrumentalities of govern-
ment, both as now used and potentially, have been discussed elsewhere.80
Suffice it to say here that such an organizational form offers definite
possibilities for the functional decentralization of governmental power-
possibilities which should be further explored.
1 See BLACrnY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 10 at 286-289, for their sum-
mary of recommendations for a reformed administrative system including both the
problem of administrative legislation and that of administrative adjudication.
" Pinney, Federal Government Corporations as Instrumentalities of Govern-
ment and of Administration (unpublished thesis in New York University Library)
cc. XIV, XV, XVI.
